

49 Indeed, the oneness of a whole, which unites all its parts, is greater than is the oneness of a uniteable part. For the less oneness a thing actually has and the more oneness it potentially has, the more changeable that thing is; for the oneness that unites is more perfect than is the oneness that can be united. And the more conditions-of-oneness you see to concur in something's oneness, the more perfect [is that oneness]. For "oneness" conveys the idea of a beginning and an end (*finis*) that unite with each other. Therefore, oneness-of-soul is more perfect than is oneness-of-body, because the purpose (*finis*) of oneness-of-body is oneness-of-soul. The corporeal depends upon oneness-of-soul as upon a certain beginning of the corporeal. For if the soul is removed, then the body's oneness is dissolved and perishes.<sup>125</sup>

However, we see that some onenesses are more in a potential state of being united, whereas others are more in a state of actual unitedness. Thus, in the case of things that admit of more and less we do not come to an unqualifiedly maximum or to an unqualifiedly minimum. We do not even arrive at determinate and perceptible elemental onenesses that are *actually lowest* and *actually minimal*, although reason believes there to be [such minimal elemental units] and believes them to be uniteable to one another and to exist only in continuous uniteability. In these [minimal elemental units, reason believes,] oneness is present amid continual change. Likewise, too, reason believes, we arrive at *actually maximal* onenesses, where the potential for uniteability is perfectly actualized and awaits no further union.

50 Notice, then, that you must form a conception by intellect alone—above reason<sup>126</sup>—in order [justifiably] to claim both that there can be no progression<sup>127</sup> to the infinite and that we cannot come [by means of a progression] to an actually maximum or to an actually minimum.<sup>128</sup> For example, we could not recognize which sample-of-earth would be only elemental, since any givable sample-of-earth is distinct [in some measure] from every other sample-of-earth and is not an element. The situation is similar concerning water. For there is no sample-of-water that does not distinctly differ, in its degree of elementariness, from [every] other sample-of-water. Therefore, an actually minimum thing or an actually maximum thing is unknowable. Consider [this issue] in regard to quantity. If than any given number a greater number is positable, then we know both that there is no infinite number and that no given number is maximal. Similarly, even if every quantity were divisible into ever-further divisibles, we would