

Libro de Causis [Vol. XXI (1949) of *Sancti Thomae ... Opera Omnia* (New York: Musurgia Publishers)], Lectio XXIV (p. 752^b). Cf. *The Book of Causes (Liber de Causis)*, translated by Dennis J. Brand [Marquette, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1984 (revised edition)], XXIII (XXIV), 179.

142. *DI* II, 13 (179:5-11). *De Filiatione Dei* 3 (65-66). *De Principio* 21:9-11.

143. See the references in n. 139 above.

144. "... the variety of visible things is enfolded concordantly in the oneness of sight": i.e., a single act of vision unites many perceived objects into a single perceptual image.

145. "... absolute sight": i.e., sight considered in and of itself.

146. Here at 55:17 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) "*creatas*" in place of "*creatae*".

147. See n. 17 above.

148. *DI* II, 2 (103:1-9).

149. "... of our intelligence": i.e., of our [respective] intellect. See n. 36 above. Re "partaking of that unimpartible, most actual Light" see the following: *DC* II, 6 (104). *De Quaerendo Deum* 2 (37:13-14). *De Filiatione Dei* 4 (78:5-6) and 5 (80:3-4). *NA* 16 (79:4-6). *VS* 7 (16:3-7). *VS* 22 (65:23-24). *Sermo* "Verbum caro factum est," [as edited by Josef Koch in *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse* (Jahrgang 1936/37. Zweite Abhandlung)], p. 80, lines 22-25. (This sermon corresponds to Haubst number CXLI.)

150. See n. 149 above.

151. Here at 57:10 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) "*contemplanis*" in place of "*contemplaras*".

152. This sentence is the closest that Nicholas comes to a definition of "*coniectura*". It indicates that truth as it is in and of itself cannot be partaken of precisely; i.e., human beings cannot know the precise truth. Yet, the sentence also shows that *coniecturae* contain some measure of truth. Nicholas emphasizes that all empirical knowledge is perspectival. In this way, even the making of *reliable* empirical inferences is but a form of "surmising"—as, in another way, is also the making of *a priori* and self-evident judgments. For example, reason judges that a whole is greater than is any one of its parts and that the circumference of a circle is greater than is the circle's center. But intellect judges that the circle's circumference and center coincide. Regarding all these assertions, see *DC* II, 16 (168). *DC* I, 11 (57:11-17). *DC* II, 1 (75). *DC* II, 2 (80-81). *Sermo* CXXX (5).

153. *DC* I, 3 (11:5 - 13:16).

154. Nicholas is referring to his composite position in *DI*, not to a particular passage. But cf. *DI* II, 3 (107) with *DI* I, 17 (49) and *DI* II, 2 (104). No thing can partake of another thing as that other thing is in and of itself. For all partaking occurs with a degree of otherness. Where there is no otherness the "partaking" is a coincidence. See the last sentence of *DC* II, 1 (75).

155. Just as oneness is partaken of not *per se* but through its modes, so God is partaken of not *per se* but only through likenesses. See the references in n. 17 above. See also *De Filiatione Dei* 3 (63).

156. "... of the denary unfolding": i.e., of the tenfold unfolding as it is illustrated in the immediately preceding diagram.

157. Here at 60:2 I am surmising "*complicatoriae*" in place of "*complicatorie*".