

lowing the usage of Scripture (John 1:5), he is even willing to say “*tenebrae eam [i.e., lucem] comprehendere nequeunt*” [I, 26 (86:15-16)], where “*apprehendere*” would serve equally well. And just as at 11:9-10 he uses the expression “*sensu apprehendere*,” so in *Ap.* 2:18 he understands the expression “*comprehendi nequeat*” to mean “*sensu comprehendi nequeat*.” It is difficult to know whether at *Ap.* 2:18 he would likewise be willing to say “*apprehendi nequeat*.” As a rule, throughout his writings, both “*incomprehensibilis*” and “*inapprehensibilis*” could acceptably be translated by the one English word “ungraspable.”

16. *DI* I, 1 (3:2-3); II, 2 (102:4-5).

17. See II, 1 for examples of this point.

18. *DI* II, 1 (91:14-15).

19. The example of an inscribed polygon is also used in *DI* III, 1 (188:15-19); III, 4 (206:12-18).

20. Cf. *NA* 85:15-20.

21. In *NA* Nicholas elaborates upon the motif that God is not *other* than anything.

In calling God Equality of being and Form of being [*DI* I, 8 (22:8-10)], Nicholas is not suggesting that we can conceive of what it is like for God to be such Equality and such Form [*DI* I, 4 (11:7-9); I, 12 (33:4-6)]. Indeed, learned ignorance consists of the joint recognition that God is undifferentiated being itself and that such being is inconceivable by every finite intellect.

22. Regarding the translation of “[*est*] *omne id quod esse potest*,” see *PNC*, pp. 173-174, n. 12 and p. 165, n. 66.

23. Only the maximum thus freed from quantity—i.e., only the absolutely Maximum—coincides with the (absolutely) Minimum. At the end of the present chapter Nicholas makes clear that insofar as the terms “maximum” and “minimum” refer to God, they refer to what is beyond all contraction to quantity (or anything else). See n. 34 below. Cf. *DI* II, 8 (140:7-8); II, 9 (148:8; 150:9-10); III, 1 (182:5-6; 183:10-13); II, 8 (136:9-10). Especially note *De Visione Dei* 13 (58:11-12). *Complementum Theologicum* 12 (last 7 lines), Paris edition. *DP* 69:6 - 70:11.

Similarly, only absolutely maximum motion coincides with (absolutely) minimum motion [II, 10 (155:1-3)]—both of which are “motion” only in a metaphorical sense. Cf. *DP* 10-11. Likewise, absolutely maximum faith [III, 11 (249:1-2)] is not faith in any sense of “faith” that we can understand; for it coincides with God’s knowledge, and God’s knowledge is God, who is inconceivable except to Himself.

24. Nicholas does not here distinguish *intellectus* (intellect, understanding) and *ratio* (reason, reasoning), as he does at *DI* III, 6 (215:5-6). Also note I, 10 (27:14-18); I, 24 (76:4-5); II, 2 (100:9-10); III, 9 (233:6-7); III, 10 (240:1-2). See *PNC*, p. 172, n. 175.

25. *DI* I, 26.

26. No matter where you stop on the ascending scale, you stop at a finite number. No matter how far you count, you will have counted only a finite series. [Cf. *DI* II, 1 (96:1-18).] In this sense, the ascending scale is “actually” finite, though potentially infinite.

27. Apparently, Nicholas is arguing, straightforwardly, that if there were no *source* of number, which he has already shown to be finite, then there would not be any number. Note the English clause in parentheses at the close of this chapter.

Nicholas regards fractions not as numbers but as relations between two num-