

102 Moreover, there is another spirit that is configurable—though in a gross and nondiscrete manner—to all perceptual forms; it is present in the instrument of the imagination. And in the instrument of reason there is present another spirit, which is configurable discretely and clearly to all perceptible things. All these configurations are assimilations for perceptible objects, since they are assimilations made through the intermediacy of corporeal (albeit subtle) spirits.⁶³ Hence, since mind makes these assimilations in order to have concepts of perceptible objects—and to this end mind is operative in a corporeal spirit—mind acts as a soul, enlivening the body. (By means of this enlivening an animal is constituted [an animal]. Thus, in its own manner the soul of brute animals makes assimilations that are similar [to ours,] although more confused, so that in its own manner it acquires concepts.) Now, from such concepts as those elicited in the foregoing way by assimilation, our mental power makes mechanical arts and both empirical and logical surmises. And it attains unto things in the manner in which they are conceived to be in the possibility-of-being, i.e., in matter, and in the manner in which the possibility-of-being is determined by form. Therefore, since [our mind] attains, by means of these assimilations, only unto concepts for perceptible objects (objects whose forms are not the true [formal natures]⁶⁴ but are forms obscured because of the changeability of the material), it follows that all such concepts are surmises rather than true [representations]. So, then, I maintain that concepts which are attained by means of assimilations made by reason are subject to uncertainty,⁶⁵ because they are [made] in accordance with *images* of the [true] formal natures rather than in accordance with the true formal natures themselves.⁶⁶

103 Hereafter, when our mind (not insofar as it is operative in a body that it enlivens but insofar as it is mind per se, yet uniteable to a body) looks unto its own immutability, it makes assimilations of forms not as they are embedded in matter but as they are in and of themselves. And it conceives the immutable quiddities of things, using itself as its own instrument, apart from any instrumental [corporeal] spirit⁶⁷—as, for example, when it conceives a circle to be a figure from whose center all lines that are extended to the circumference are equal. In this way of existing no circle can exist extra-mentally, in matter. For it is impossible that in a material there be two equal lines; even less is it possible that any such [perfect material-]circle be constructible.⁶⁸ Hence, the circle in the mind is the exemplar, and measure-of-truth, of a circle in a [patterned] floor. Thus, we say that in the mind the