ent in everything that is ordered, and in it all ordered things are present—present in the way in which we premised in the general proposition at the outset [324] [of our discussion]. But in this Order,[325] which is the Exemplar of all orders, it is necessary that the Middle be most simple, since the Order is most simple. Therefore, the Middle will be so equal that it will be Equality itself. This Order cannot be understood by us by means of any other distinguishing than by means of a most well-ordered progression that begins with oneness [326] and ends with the number three. In this progression the very simple middle-term is equally in between the beginning-term and the end-term. For 2 is the precise and equal [arithmetical] mean between 1 and 3, and it is the precise third part of the entire order and progression. We cannot discern most simple Divine Order otherwise than by means of this just-mentioned [arithmetical] progression. And since [in God] the Middle is an equal Middle: just as it is undifferentiated from Equality, so too it remains the same in essence as the Beginning and the End. For of different essences there cannot be precise equality.

108   Now, no order that has from the aforementioned most simple Order the fact that it is an order can have a simple and equal middle. For every order except the most simple Order is a composite. But everything composite is composed of unequals. For it is impossible that a plurality of composible parts be precisely equal. For [if they were precisely equal], they would not be either a *plurality* or *parts*. Moreover, equality is not repeatable. And so, in the first, most simple Order there is a single Equality of three hypostases;[327] for it is impossible that there be more than one Equality, since plurality is a consequence of otherness and of inequality. Therefore, if in an ordained order, i.e., in a created order, there cannot be a simple and equal middle, then [that order] does not come to an end with a three-term progression [such as the progression 1, 2, 3]. Rather, there is a further progression into compositeness. Now, the number four takes its beginning immediately from the first progression [viz., from the progression 1, 2, 3]; and it would not do so unless [its progression] were an ordered progression. Therefore, that which is required by an ordered progression that begins from the first and very well ordered progression [viz., the progression 1, 2, 3] is, necessarily, present in the four-term progression. And so, [the four-term progression, viz., 1, 2, 3, 4,] has a composite middle-term, viz., 2 and 3, which, taken together, are the mean of the entire progression. For 1 and 2 and 3 and 4, added together, are 10; but 2 and 3, added together, are 5, which is the mean