

- 32 However, Plato posited two beginnings that are subsequent to the One: viz., the finite and the infinite—as, by way of illustration, number is (subsequently to the *one*) from the finite and the infinite. For if you consider a number's oneness as separate from the number, [you will see that] it is the monad¹²² and is not a number but is the beginning of number.¹²³ If you consider multitude as existing utterly apart from oneness, [you will see that] it is a kind of infinity. Therefore, number is seen to be constituted from oneness and multitude as from the finite and the infinite. A similar point holds regarding [the constitution of] every being. However, Plato takes infinity for something boundless and confused yet suited to being bounded and delimited; and he takes the finite for form that delimits and bounds the infinity.
- 33 Moreover, if someone observes quite closely, [he will see that] the position of Melissus is not as absurd as Aristotle made it out to be.¹²⁴ For in our every consideration nothing other than infinity is seen: viz., a Delimiting Infinity and a delimitable infinity. Delimiting Infinity is a Limit-of-which-there-is-no-limit; and it is a Beginning that exists *per se* and that enfolds every limit; and it is God, [who is] prior to every [finite] being. On the other hand, the delimitable infinity is a lack of every boundary and of every determinateness—a lack that is delimitable by the Infinite Limit;¹²⁵ and the delimitable infinity is subsequent¹²⁶ to every [finite] being. Therefore, when the First Infinity delimits the second,¹²⁷ finite being arises from the Infinite Beginning, i.e., arises from the First [Infinity], which is *more than* [finite] being, since it precedes [finite] being. [Finite] being does not arise from the second [infinity], since the second infinity is subsequent to [finite] being. In the First Infinity all things determinable are present actually; in the second infinity all things determinable are present with respect to the omnipotence of the First Infinity, just as we say that all things can be created from nothing by the Almighty.¹²⁸ [We do] not [mean] that in nothing all things are present in potency¹²⁹—unless “potency” refers to *omnipotency*, where the possibility-of-making coincides with the possibility-of-being-made.¹³⁰ You might conceive of the nothing [in question] as the material utilized by the Omnipotent Form—material which He forms as He wills to. And [you might conceive of] the material utilized by a non-omnipotent form, i.e., by a finite power, to be a material that is not nothing but is a more formable or a less resistant material, viz., the possibility of being *that thing* which the form can form—in other words, a material that is receptive and compliant, so that it merits such a form. This [is what] Plato