

have an innate power of judgment. See also *DM* 15 (158:15-18). *Compendium* 10 (34:1-2).

33. *De Quaerendo Deum* 1 (20-22).

34. "... is brought ... from potency to actuality": i.e., is brought from the possibility of being seen to actually being seen.

35. *De Quaerendo Deum* 1 (20:6-10). *Compendium* 4 (9:10-12).

36. Even in his late works, such as the present one and the *Compendium*, Nicholas holds the view that empirical knowledge results from the intellect's abstracting an intelligible form, i.e., a concept, from sensory images. Cf. *Compendium* 6 (18:17-19). *DP* 60:16-21. *VS* 36 (107:2). See n. 132 of the Notes to *De Beryllo*. See also, in his early work *DI*, the passages at II, 6 (126) and II, 9 (150:last part). Note also pp. 29-31 of my *Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge*.

37. "This seed" refers to the possibility-of-being-made, which Nicholas a few lines later calls the seed of seeds.

38. According to Nicholas non-human animals do not have intellect (*intellectus*) but they do have some degree of reason (*ratio*). *DM* 5 (83). See p. 62 of my *Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge*.

39. The Latin passage here at 6 (15:18-22) is confusedly written. I understand it as I have translated it. Cf. *VS* 7 (18:12-19). See my n. 1 above.

40. The Creating Cause, viz., God, cannot be partaken of; only His likeness can be partaken of. See *NA* 16 (79:5-6). *VS* 22 (65:23-24). *VS* 7 (16:5-7). *De Filiatione Dei* 4 (78:2-6). *De Filiatione Dei* 5 (80:1-4). *Sermo "Verbum caro factum est"* section 8, lines 22-27 on p. 80 of Josef Koch, editor, *Vier Predigten im Geiste Eckharts* [Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse (1936/37), 2. Abhandlung]. See the last paragraph of Chap. 6 above, where *posse-fieri* is said to be a likeness of God (who is *posse-facere*). God *can be* named but only symbolically and metaphorically, since there is no comparative relation between the infinite and the finite. He *cannot* be named by any name that tells us, really, what He is or what He is like. God is not even *one* or *being* (says Nicholas) in any sense in which the meanings of these terms can be understood by finite minds, whether human or angelic.

41. *Ap.* 17 (last half).

42. As at *VS* 7 (17:5) medieval writers sometimes use only "*implicat*" where "*implicat contradictionem*" is understood. I prefer to supply "*contradictionem*" here so as to prevent confusion. Nicholas himself supplies it at *De Theologicis Complementis* 3:47. Cf. John Wenck, *De Ignota Litteratura* 30:27-28 and 36:26 [Latin text as found in my *Nicholas of Cusa's Debate with John Wenck* (Minneapolis: Banning, 1984)]. See also p. 150, n. 4 in Raymond Klibansky and Hans G. Senger's edition of *De Venatione Sapientiae* [Vol. XII of *Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982)].

43. Thomas Aquinas, *De Aeternitate Mundi*, near the beginning. See Aquinas *et al.*, *On the Eternity of the World*, translated by Cyril Vollert *et al.* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964), p. 19 (bottom).

At *VS* 26 (77:6-7) Nicholas mentions both Thomas and his *De Aeternitate Mundi*.

44. Pseudo-Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* IX. 4 (*Dionysiaca* I, 458-459. *PG* 3:911). Nicholas here follows the Latin translation of Robert Grosseteste, completed ca. 1235. The facing Latin translation found in *PG* is that of Balthasar Cordier, made